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Licences and the Summary Proceedings
Provisions
GERALD M. ADLER*
The subtle and technical distinction between lease and licence has
provoked several eminent jurists,1 within the last decade, to comment
upon the subject and its effect upon assignees of the land. The issue,
in general, has given much trouble to lawyers, both academicians and
practitioners since Wood v. Leadbitter,2 but judicial precedent has
so changed the distinction then made, that to apply it rigidly, in the
context of today's social and economic development, would tend to
incongruity. However, it is not intended in this article to explore
the wider field which has been already covered, but to examine, in
some detail, the differentiation which is said to exist between lease
and licence within the terms of the Landlord and Tenant Act. More
specifically the question is whether, within the terms of the Act, there
is any distinction between the two types of "interest" with regard to
the "owner's" right to terminate, or to recover possession from the
overholding "occupant".
The recent case of Willoughby v. Willoughby3 decided in the
Ontario Court of Appeal, held that a licensor could not apply to the
Court, under summary provisions of the Act, to recover possession
from an overholding licensee who had been given notice to terminate.
Briefly the facts in the Willoughby case were that the parties in
1951 and 1958 in the course of their discordant marriage, had entered
into two agreements of separation, by which in the result, the hus-
band conveyed, inter alia, to the wife their matrimonial home to be
held in trust for their daughter; upon whose majority or marriage
the property was to vest in the wife absolutely. In return, the wife
promised not to lock or put out the husband so long as both parties
lived together as man and wife. In 1959, marital relations became
strained once again, and the wife removed herself from the premises.
She had issued, on her behalf, a demand for possession which was
Mr. Adler is presently in his 2nd year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Wade, Licenses and Third Parties (1952), 68 Law Q. Rev. 337; Williams,
Interests and Clogs (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev. 1004; Cheshire, A New Equitable
Interest (1953) 16 Mod. L. Rev. 1; Hanbury, Licences, A Jonah's Gourd (1954)
Camb. L.J. 201; Stoljar, Licence Interest and Contract (1955) 33 Can. Bar
Rev. 562; Wade, What is a Licence? (1948) 64 Law Q. Rev. 57.
2 Wood v. Leadbitter 13 M. & W. 838, 153 E.R. 351.
3 Willoughby v. Willoughby [1960] O.R. 276, (1960) 23 D.L.R. (2d.) 312.
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ignored. As a result, summary proceedings under Part I of the
Landlord and Tenant Act were instituted.
The County Court Judge found that the husband's occupation
of the premises after the departure of the wife was as a tenant at will.
Having found the relationship of landlord and tenant to subsist, he
issued an order for possession in favour of the wife. A major ques-
tion before the Court of Appeal was whether the classification of
the parties by the County Court Judge was correct. Morden, J.A.,
in delivering the judgment of the court, classified the relationship as
that of licensor and licensee and concluded:
4
There remains for determination... whether Part m of the act, In view
of the definition contained in that Act, can be invoked by a licensor
against a licensee. That is a relationship which does not 'vest in the
licensee any estate or interest in the land, and the licensor and licensee
do not "ocupy substantially the position of landlord and tenant."...
If the right of an occupant is no greater than a personal right conferring
on him no interest in the land, he is not substantially in the position of
a tenant and quoad such a person, the summary procedure authorized
by the Act cannot be properly invoked. (emphasis added)
Consequently the Court held that the County Court Judge was with-
out jurisdiction.
In view of the fact that the position of a licensor under Part HI
of the Act had been questioned directly only once before in the
reported cases,5 it is important to examine whether within the On-
tario Act and its previous judicial interpretation, there is any
justification for refusing the licensor's application for recovery of
possession by way of summary proceedings.
Section 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act6 provides:
1. In this Act,
(b) "Landlord" includes lessor, owner, the person giving or permitting
the occupation of the premises in question and his and their heirs
and assigns and legal representatives and in Parts II and III also
includes the person entitled to possession of the premises.
(d) "Tenant" includes lessee, occupant, subtenant, undertenant and his
and their assigns and legal representatives.
The provisions which permit an application by a landlord to the
County Court Judge against an overholding tenant are to be found in
Part I of the Act, section 75 of which provides in part:
75. (1) Where a tenant after his lease or right of occupation . .. has
expired or been determined... by a notice to quit or notice pur-
suant to a proviso in a lease ... or has been determined by any
other act whereby a tenancy or right of occupancy may be de-
termined, or put an end to, wrongfully refused or neglects to go out
of possession of the land ... which he has been permitted to occupy,
his landlord may apply . . . to the judge of the county or district
court of the county or district in which the land lies to make the
enquiry hereinafter provided for.
4 Id. p. 283.
5 Reliance Petroleum Ltd. v. Rosenblood [1953] O.W.N. 115.
6 R.S.O. 1960, c. 206.
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(2) The judge shall ... inquire and determine whether the person
complained of was a tenant to the complainant for a term or period
... that has been determined... and whether the tenant holds the
possession against the right of the landlord, and whether the tenant,
having no right to continue in possession, wrongfully refuses to go
out of possession.
Section 77 of the Act empowers the Judge to hear, in a summary
manner, the parties and witnesses, and if it appears to him that the
tenant wrongfully holds over, he may order the issue of a writ of
possession.
The precursor of the above sections are to be found in Ontario as
early as 1834 in the Upper Canada Real Property Act7 of that year.
Section 53 of the Act stated:
53. Whereas the wrong committed by tenants in holding over vexatiously
and without colour of right after their term has expired requires a
speedy and less expensive remedy than is now provided for by law;
be it therefore enacted ... that it shall and may be lawful for any
landlord whose tenant shall after the expiration of his term . . .
refuse upon demand made in writing to go out of possession of the
lands demised to him to apply to the Court of King's Bench [and
after complying with certain conditions] it shall be lawful for such
a Court or Judge . . . to place the landlord in possession of the
premises in question.
It should be noted that this Act neither defined the terms "landlord"
or "tenant", nor did it give jurisdiction to the court in a case where
the tenancy had been terminated by a breach of covenant, but rather
was applicable only "after the expiration of his [the tenant's] term".
In 1867, "An Act Respecting Overholding Tenants" was intro-
duceds enlarging not only the provision of the 1834 Act but also its
amending Act of 1864. 9 It included, for the first time, a definition
of "landlord" and "tenant" (in substantially the same terms as the
present Act), and also provision for summary proceedings. The latter
were no longer to be confined to application upon the expiry of the
agreement, but were extended to situations where either notice to quit
had been served, or the right of occupancy, had been determined in
some way. These provision were re-enacted under the Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1911 LO and appear without significant change in the
current version of the Landlord and Tenant Act.'
Similar legislation is to be found in most of the other common
law provinces. It is interesting to note that the 1937 Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation had recommended that
a Uniform Act be adopted by the provinces. In view of the difficulties
that had been encountered in its application and the fact that only a
small minority of the provinces adopted the Uniform Act,' 2 the con-
ference withdrew its recommendations in 1954. In the Committee's
7 Statutes of Upper Canada 4 Will. IV c. 1.
8 Statutes of Ontario 31 Vict. c. 26.
9 Statutes of Ontario, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 30.
10 Statutes of Ontario 1 George V c. 289.
31 Supra footnote 6.
12 As of 1954, only Prince Edward Island (1939) New Brunswick (1938)
and the North West Territories had adopted the Uniform Act.
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report Chief Justice Williams commented that, although there were
great differences in the laws of the provinces on the subject, such
differences appeared to be unnecessary.13 One difference alluded to
is to be found in section 19(2) of the British Columbia 14 statute
which has extended the applicability of the summary proceedings to
tenancies from week to week, from month to month, from year to year
and tenancies at will as well as all other terms, tenancies, holdings or
occupations.
This provision seems wider than the Ontario counterpart and in
terms, it appears to cover all forms of occupancy including a license.
H
The question which arose in the Willoughby case was whether a
licence fell within the provisions of the Ontario Act. It is submitted
that the terms of section 1, defining a landlord as a person "permit-
ting the occupation of the premises" and including for the purpose
of Part MII "a person entitled to possession of the premises", are
prima facie, wide enough to include a contractual licensor. The
licensee obtains his occupation of the premises by virtue of the
permission of the licensor, and upon that permission having been
validly terminated the licensor, is entitled to occupation. The term
"tenant" is stated to include an "occupant". If this term is to have
any meaning, it is submitted that it might well include a licensee, for
the other forms of occupation with respect to which the landlord gives
his permission are dealt with specifically by the other terms of the
section.
An additional argument in support of this proposition is to be
found under section 2 of the current Act which reads in part as
follows:
The relation of landlord and tenant does not depend on tenure, and
a reversion in the lessor is not necessary In order to create the relation
of landlord and tenant; or to make applicable the incidents by law
belonging to that relation....
This section appears to have never been judicially considered with
respect to its application to a licence.
The legislature when originally enacting this provision seems to
have given an indication of what was intended. The current pro-
visions were first enacted by section 3 (1) of the 1896 Act,'5 which
by its terms, repealed an earlier provision, section 4 of the 1895 Act.16
However, section 3 (2) of the 1896 Act reads:
It is hereby declared that the said section Es. 4 of the 1895 Act] was
Intended to express the same meaning as this section [now s. 2 of the
current Act] and no other.
13 Minutes of Thirty Sixth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1954, pp. 18-19.
14 R.S.B.C. 1960 c. 207.
15 Statutes of Ontario 59 Vict. c. 42.
16 Statutes of Ontario 58 Vict. c. 26.
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The repealed Section 4 of the 1895 Act, appears to have been
intended to found the relationship of landlord and tenant solely upon
contract:
The relationship of landlord and tenant shall be deemed to be founded
in the express or implied contract of the parties and not upon tenure or
service and a reversion shall not be necessary to such a relation which
shall be deemed to subsist in all cases where there shall be an agreement
to hold land from or under another in consideration of any rent.
It would seem that the provisions of the 1895 Act were designed,
at least, to incorporate within the relationship of "landlord and
tenant", one who had gone into possession under an agreement for
a lease, but it is submitted, that, since contractual licence also falls
within the words of the first phrase of the section, its provisions may
be taken to include the contractual relationship of licensor and
licensee.
m
Judicial interpretation of the "definition" sections has not thrown
much light on the problem of licences before the Willoughby case in
1960. The leading Ontario case dealing with Part III of the Act is
Be Mitchell v. Fraserls where Meredith, C.J.C.P., in dismissing an
application for a writ of possession brought by a mortgagor, said:
The person entitled to possession of the premises in these proceedings
under the enactment respecting 'overholding tenants' must be someone of
the character of a landlord ... and the occupant must be someone of
the character of a tenant. (emphasis added)19
The obvious question which arises is how to determine when a person
permitting the occupation of premises has or has not the "character
of a landlord", and similarly when an occupant has or has not the
"character of a tenant." The learned Chief Justice suggested that "a
person claiming under a paper title" did not have the character of a
landlord, while one claiming title "by length of possession" could not
have the character of a tenant.
There must be a lease or "right of occupation" which has "expired or
been determined . . . there must be a demise or an agreement under
which the tenant is "permitted" to occupy the land and this permission
must be one which will ... be determined by a notice pursuant to a term
of the agreement!" (emphasis added)
It is submitted that a licence falls within the test, inasmuch as a
licensee has been held to have a right of occupation, terminable either
17 This subsection of the 1896 Act does not appear to have been repealed,
however the Revised Statutes, enacted in the next year, contained the follow-
ig section in the Landlord and Tenant Act. "S.3. The relationship of Land-
lord and Tenant did not since the 15th day of April, 1895, and shall not
hereafter depend on tenure and reversion or remainder... shall not be
necessary in order to create the relationship of Landlord and Tenant or
make applicable the ingredients by law belonging to that relation nor shall
any agreement between the parties be necessary to give a landlord the right
of distress."
18 (1917) 40 O.L.R. 389.
29 Id. at p. 391.
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after notice, or at once, but on giving the licensee reasonable time
to vacate the premises. 20
The case of Fyhrie v. Burke- would seem to support the proposi-
tion that a licence is within the terms of the Act. In applying section
49(1) of the Saskatchewan Landlord and Tenant Act22 [identical to
the Ontario Act] Taylor J. stated that the relationship of landlord and
tenant did not exist between a purchaser at a tax sale and a tenant
of the previous owner, and therefore,
it would be necessary to establish at least some kind of permission,
licence or allowance constituting a right of occupancy to support such an
argument [for an application under the summary proceedings] and none
such existed. (emphasis added)
The only other reported Ontario case which specifically dealt
with the position of a licensee under Part I of the Act, was
Reliance Petroleum Ltd. v. Rosenblood et al.23 There the County
Court Judge held24 that
where - the substance of the agreement between the parties Is that the
grantee is not to hold the right of exclusive possession of the premises,
but only a right to use them, the agreement operates as a licence and
not as a lease .... As I said, upon this ground and without further con-
sideration and deliberation upon the various arguments advanced by the
respondents, I dismiss the application with, costs. (emphasis added)
It is submitted that this decision, unsupported by reasons is not very
strong authority for the proposition that a licensee is not an occupant
within the meaning of the Act.
IV
The Willoughby case specifically holds that a contractual licence
is not within the terms of Part TIT of the Act.25 Upon what principles
is such an exclusion based? Clearly, to allow the summary proceed-
ings to be applied to a lessor, who has granted away a 'greater interest'
in the premises, but to prohibit the proceedings to a licensor, who
has granted away a 'lesser interest', would seem to be incongruous.
It would appear that two questions have to be answered by the
County Court Judge in an application under Part Il. Firstly, does
he have jurisdiction? If so, then secondly, should he make the order
sought?26
20 Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd. v. Millenium Productions Ltd.,
[1948] A.C. 173; Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd., [1951] 1 K.B. 1; C.P.R. V.
The King [1931] A.C. 414, 2 D.L.R. 386.
21 [1924] 4 D.L.R. 445. See also, Altbaum v. Northover [1949] O.W.N. 415,
3 D.L.R. 337.
22 R.S.S. 1920 c. 160.
23 [1953] O.W.N. 115.
24 Id. at p. 116.
25 Supra, footnote 3.
26 It is submitted that the Courts have confused these two Issues with
the result that they often refuse to give relief to the landlord basing the dis-
missal of the application on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction when In
reality, they are exercising their discretion without determining the question
of jurisdiction.
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To determine the question of jursdiction under Part IT the Court
is required to ascertain firstly whether the person still in possession
is a "tenant" and secondly whether that "tenant", has any right to
continue in possession. It is submitted that in answering the first
question the Court is not required to make a distinction between a
lease and a licence for the purpose of finding jurisdiction within the
terms of Part TIH of the Act for both a licensee and tenant have the
"character of a tenant,"27 to use the words of Meredith J. in Re
MitcheU and Fraser.
Four propositions are put forward in support of the contention
that a licensee and a lessee both stand in substantially the same
position with respect to the applicant. Firstly, on the point of termin-
ating the interest in question, it is submitted there is no ground for
distinguishing between the two types of interest under Part lIT. Both
the lease and the licence are determinable in some manner and having
been so determined, the duty of the County Court Judge is to enquire
whether the "tenant" holds over wrongfully after that interest has
been terminated.28 The manner in which the licence is determined is
completely irrelevant to the question of finding jurisdiction.29
Secondly, as between licensor and licensee there is no argument
as to the licensee's derivative "title"-the licensee acknowledges that
he derives his right of occupation from the licensor,30 and similarly,
a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's superior title.3 1 This
similarity should be contrasted to the situation where an owner of
the fee in the land brings an action for recovery of possession against
a trespasser. In the latter case, it is clear that the trespasser might
well set up the defence of having acquired a title by adverse posses-
sion, but in contrasting a lease with a licence this problem does not
arise. In Casey v. Helier,32 Lord Esher, M.R. in referring to a rule
which is practically identical to the section now under consideration
said:33
27 See footnote 18.
28 As both a lease and licence have this issue in common and must be
answered in either case there would seem to be no reason for having to avoid
this decision solely on the grounds that the interest is a licence.
29 Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd. 'v. Millenium Products Ltd.
supra; Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd. supra; Bendafl v. McWhirter (1952]
1 All E.R. 1307; Starkman v. Delhi Court Ltd., (1961), 24 D.L.R. (2d.) 152
and on appeal (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d.) 270. At trial Ferguson J. indicated, at p.
155, a distinction should be made between the power to terminate a licence
and the right to terminate it. It is submitted that such a distinction is no
longer tenable since, at least, the administration of Equity and Common Law
is vested in the same court. Once the court finds the licensor to have no
right to terminate, it is submitted that the use of his power to terminate
could be restrained by injunction. The Court of Appeal reversed the finding
of the trial judge and found the defendents to be trespassers.
30 Doe d. Johnson v. Baytup (1835), 3 Ad. & El. 188, Ill E.R. 834.
31 Morton v. Woods (1869), 38 L.J.Q.B. 81; Hartcup v. Bell (1883), Cab.
and El. 19.
32 Casey v. Hellier (1886), 55 L.J.Q.B. 207.
33 Id. at 208.
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Looking at the context of the examples given, I think that the [summary]
procedure applies to the most simple cases as for example the direct
relationship of Landlord and Tenant where there has been an attorn-
ment to the landlord, so that there is no title to prove.3 4, 35 (emphasis
added)
Thirdly, and as a corollary to the above proposition, it is sub-
mitted that assignees of the lessor's reversion or of the licensor's fee
both stand in the same position with regard to an application under
Part ]I[. Where both assignees have taken with notice of the interest
of the overholding "occupant", then according to Bendafl v. McWhir-
ter,3 6 and Errington v. Errington3 7 such occupancy is binding upon
them.
There would seem to be no reason, therefore, why a summary
application by the licensor's assignee should be refused, where in
similar circumstances an application by the lessor's assignee would
succeed. It must be noted that for the licence to be binding, upon
the assignee of the licensor's fee two conditions must be satisfied;
(a) the licence must have been acted upon and (b) subject to some
qualification, the assignee must have had notice. However these
conditions do not affect the proposition stated above. If there has
been no occupation, clearly it is unnecessary to bring any action
under Part III of the Act. As regards (b), if the assignee should
claim he took without notice, then by his own objection he is pre-
cluded from utilizing Part EIE because he immediately brings into
issue the question of the licensee's derivative title.-s
Fourth, it is submitted that the point raised in the Willoughby
case that a lease creates an estate and a licence does not, is not
relevant in an application under Part III. It is conceded that for
some purposes such a distinction may be valid and indeed necessary.39
If the lease or licence have either terminated or been determined
then it makes no difference in a summary application for recovery
of possession. But even assuming there might be a difference in
84 Cf. Courville v. Pretty, [1948] O.W.N. 359, Manitoba Farm Loans
Assoc. v. Zalondec, [1933] 1 W.W.R. 559, 3 D.L.R. 128; Fylkri v. Burke, [1924J
3 W.W.R. 329; [1924] 4 D.L.R. 445.
85 See generally, Hill and Redman, Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 ed.
1960 Butterworth, pp. 7-8.
36 Bendall v. McWhirter, supra. Denning L.J. after holding the licence
to be binding on the trustee in bankruptcy said "Every contractual licence
imparts a negative covenant that the licensor will not interfere with the use
and occupation of the licensee in breach of the contract This negative cove-
nant is binding on the successors in title of the licensor . it does not run
with the land so as to give a cause of action in damages for breach of con-
tract against the successor; but it is binding in equity on the conscience of
any successor who takes with notice of it He therefore cannot eject the
licensee in disregard of it.
37 Errington v. Errington, (1952] 1 All E.R. 149; 1 K.B. 290.
38 In bringing into question the derivative title, the simple relationship
of "landlord" and "tenant" in its broadest sense does not exist. One who
claims to take an assignment of the reversion without notice of the occu-
pancy immediately brings into question the fundamental basis of the rela-
tionship-i.e. initial occupancy or possession with consent or acquiescence.
39 For example it may be material in determining whether an action
for trespass will lie. Hill v. Tupper (1863) 2 H. & C. 121. This question is
discussed in Street, The Law of Torts, 2 ed. 1959 Butterworth, pp. 65-68.
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effect between the case of a lease which does create an "estate" or
"interest" and a licence-agreement which does not, it is submitted
that, in view of section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the classi-
fication is without significance. Alternatively, if it is necessary that
a tenant have an "estate" or "interest" 40 to come within the terms
of the Act, then it is now arguable that a licence might well be
classified as an "interest" in land, albeit an equitable one.4 '
Once the issue of jurisdiction has been decided, the question
arises as to whether the County Court Judge has any discretion to
exercise in the particular case. This problem is not free of doubt.
In Humans v. Doyan42 the Court of Appeal apparently approved the
dicta of Riddell J. in the case of Be Dickinson & Co. and Graham43
where the learned judge said:
40 There is the added problem of deciding what is necessary to con-
stitute an interest-is exclusive possession the crucial test or not? See
Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd. v. Crabbe, [1957] 3 All E.R. 563. Howard
v. Shaw (1841) 8 M. & W. 118; 10 L.J. Ex. 334; 151 E.R. 973; Errington v.
Errington, supra; Radaick v. Smith (1959-60) 101 Comm. L.R. 209. In this
last case Windeyer J. said: "And it has been said-especially in connection
with family relationships, charity or hospitality that allowing a person to
have exclusive possession of the premises does not necessarily indicate a
tenancy as distinct from a licence. These distinctions are largely the by-
product of rent restrictions, statutes and other legislation .... They are all
explicable if they mean, and I think they all do, that persons who are
allowed to enjoy sole occupation in fact are not necessarily to be taken to
have been given a right of exclusive possession in law .... We are not con-
cerned with the way in which a court of equity would control the parties
in the exercise of their legal rights, but with the simple question whether
at law this document created a lease or a licence." (emphasis added). This
judgment cannot pass without some criticism. To say, as Windeyer J. did,
there is a difference between sole occupation in fact and a right of exclusive
possession in law, only confuses the issue. How can a court ascertain in
an "occupation" pursuant to an oral agreement, for example whether exclu-
sive possession was granted in law or merely arose in fact. It is submitted
that today an interest in land can mean little more than a contract for a
"bundle of rights" to be held by one party against another with reference
to the occupation of land. Some contracts create greater "bundles of rights"
than others. Agreements obviously are varied in their terms, but it has been
held recently in Be B.A. Oil Co. v. Ha7pert, [1960] O.R. 71 and Re Can.
Petrofn Ltd. v. Trudell, [1960] O.R. 82, that there may still be a grant of
exclusive possession in spite of other terms which materially restrict the use
of the premises. But why should exclusive possession be the determining
factor in this "bundle of rights" when by numerous other restrictions the
landlord can effectively control the use to which the premises are put?
How many onerous restrictions must be imposed to negative the grant of
exclusive possession?
41 In the Willoughby case the Court indicated at p. 283 that "the licensee
had at most 'an equity' and not equitable interest", but it is submitted that
if such an equity is enforceable as a "clog or fetter like a lien" against the
successors of the licensor, then would it not be better to admit as Professor
Williams suggests that this right of the contractual licensee, enforceable by
equity is, in fact a new interest? See Williams, Interests and Clogs (1952),
30 Can. Bar Rev. 1004. The main value in classifying a bundle of rights as
an interest in land would seem to be in the ascertainment and determination
of the right of an occupant against third parties. Whilst it is true that a
lessee has rights in rem it is now open to question whether a licensee is not
in the same position if the licence be registered under the Registry Act or
the owner or his assign has actual notice of it.
42 [1945] 2 D.L.R. 312.
43 (1912) 8 D.L.R. 928 at p. 931.
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It is not for the County Court Judge to decide whether the right of a
tenant should be determined under the Act in question since the jurls-
diction is vested in the Court of Appeal by section 79(2).
It is submitted that if this dictum is followed the whole efficacy of
the summary proceedings under Part M is destroyed. It would mean
that after the County Court Judge has found the relationship of
landlord and tenant to subsist, he must reserve the question of dis-
cretion to the Court of Appeal. This is objectionable on at least
two grounds; (a) it is time consuming, and the summary proceedings
are no longer summary and (b) the Court of Appeal must adjudicate
without having the opportunity to hear witnesses directly and observe
their demeanour.
Assuming for the moment that the County Court Judge does
have the right to exercise discretion, then the question arises as to
when he should properly do so. The cases seem to indicate that the
application should properly be refused where the matters are too
weighty to be adjudicated upon in a summary fashion. Illustrative
of this principle is the case of Manitoba Farm Loans Association v.
Zaondek.44 There the defendant, Z, occupied his land under an un-
registered agreement for sale from an owner-mortgagor. Upon default
of the mortgage commitments by the latter, the plaintiff mortgagee
foreclosed and served notice to quit on Z. Prendergast C.J.M. and
Jennistoun J.A. expressly found that the granting of a new tenancy
by the plaintiff to a third party expressly negatived any tenancy in
the defendant Z and consequently the plaintiffs could not avail them-
selves of the summary proceedings.
Robson J.A., rather than dismissing the application on the basis
of jurisdiction, (which is the effect of the finding of the majority
of the judgments), considered the case from the point of view of
discretion. After stating that there were plausible grounds for hold-
ing that a tenancy by estoppel could have been created, and that the
plaintiff's argument that a landlord and tenant relationship existed,
he concluded that, in his opinion45
These matters [were] too weighty to be adjudicated upon finally In a
summary proceeding such as that instituted by the applicant In this
case.... It would have been better for the learned judge to have exer-
cised discretion against granting the order and left the applicant to
proceed by action for possession.
Similarly in Fitament v. Demich46 the court reviewed the authorities
in which discretion in favour of the landlord had been exercised and
stated that if it was doubtful whether the granting of a writ of
possession would do complete justice to the parties, the writ should
be refused.
The situation in which a mortgagee brings an action against a
mortgagor under Part III of the Act raises other problems, even
44 [1933] 3 D.L.R. 128.
45 Supra, at p. 134.
46 (1951) 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 522.
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where the mortgagor has attorned as tenant. There would seem to
be no doubt that an attornment clause in the mortgage deed may,
and ordinarily does, create the relationship of landlord and tenant.47
But it is suggested that this relationship is designed solely to give
the mortgagee additional security by way of the right to distrain.48
Ordinarily a mortgagee may choose among the alternative remedies
of foreclosure or sale, an action on the personal covenant, or pos-
session, where the mortgage is in default. Indeed, generally he seeks
all three concurrently. But an interference in the complicated and
conflicting rights of the mortgagor's right to redeem and the mort-
gagee's right to realize on his security wouild appear to be a matter
too weighty to be dealt with summarily under Part M. Thus, despite
the fact that by the terms of the mortgage a relationship of landlord
and tenant is created, giving the County Court Judge jurisdiction,
it would appear proper for him, in such circumstances to refuse the
application49 on the discretionary ground.
To return to the Willoughby case it is submitted that the court
there could have reached the same result more properly, without
denying the applicability of Part III to a licensor-licensee relationship
in general, by accepting jurisdiction but refusing to exercise dis-
cretion. The particular licence situation under consideration contain-
ing, as it did, such substantial complications as the trust arrangement
and the legal position of a deserted spouse50 was simply not an appro-
priate one to be dealt with by the summary procedure. It is suggested
that the correct course should have been to make an application
under the Married Women's Property Act, section 12.51
V
In view of the fact that both a mortgagee and a mortgagor may
apply to the Court for relief by way of the Mortgage Act and the
Rules of Practice and that a married woman may obtain an order,
flexible in its terms, under the Married Women's Property Act, it is
47 E, p. Jackson, In re Bowes (1880) 14 Ch. D. 725 at p. 739.
48 See Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property (2nd ed.) Stevens,
London 1959 at p. 892. See: Re Mitchell and Fraser (1917) 40 O.L.R. 389, 38
D.L.R. 597; Chalmers v. Freedman (1909) 18 Man. R. 523, 10 W.LR. 434;
Gordon v. Fraser (1918) 43 O.L.R. 31; Premier Trust v. Haxwell [1937] O.R.
497, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 449.
49 In re Reeve (1867) 4 P.R. 27 (Ont.).
50 See Laskin, The Deserted Wife's Equity in the Matrimonial Home: A
Dissent (1961) 14 University of Toronto L.J. 67.
51 Married Women's Property Act R.S.O. 1960 ch. 229. "12(1) In any
question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of prop-
erty, either party .. .may apply in a summary way to a Judge of the
Supreme Court or at the option of the applicant irrespective of the value
of the property in dispute, to the Judge of the county or district court ...
and the judge may make such order with respect to the property ... as he
thinks fit." Dickinson v. Dickinson [1948] O.W.N. 325, where the court held
on an application for partition by the husband, a joint tenant with his wife,
that s. 12(1) of the Married Women's Property Act did not apply as there
was no question as to title or possession. See Bush v. Rush [1960] 24 D.L.R.
(2d.) 325. See also Special Lectures, 1961, Law Society of Upper Canada.
Collins-Williams, The Recovery of Land, p. 29 at p. 45.
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suggested that where alternative modes of procedure are open to the
parties, then the overholding tenant provisions of the Landlord and
Tenant Act are inapplicable. In such situations where the legislature
has made available special modes of procedure applicable to certain
types of relationships then notwithstanding that there might also
be a landlord -and tenant relationship, the County Court Judge, in
his discretion, may properly refuse to make the order sought under
Part II.
It is submitted that on the above arguments there is no logical
basis for distinguishing a lease from a licence in a simple case upon
a summary application under Part EEI of the Act. In retaining this
dichotomy, it is arguable, perhaps that the courts have found a
convenient way of escaping by way of the question of jurisdiction
when they wish to avoid settling in a summary fashion a complicated
case. But, this way of dealing with the problem may have unfortunate
consequences in subsequent cases. A future court faced with a
simple licence situation is bound to dismiss the application under
Part Ill even under circumstances in which the summary proceedings
would appear appropriate.
If a licence is not to be within the terms of Part III of the Act,
then much of the efficacy of summary proceedings is lost. If for
example a simple oral agreement has been determined, then as the
law stands at present, the County Court Judge must ascertain with
considerable precision whether there is a lease or a licence. If he
finds the latter to subsist, then the owner must resort to a full scale
action for possession, and involve himself in considerable cost. In
addition the distinction just drawn may also give rise to an appeal
on that fine point of law alone and the "owner" incurs further delay
and the risk of increased costs.
The preamble to the first act dealing with overholding tenants
stated that circumstances required a more speedy and less expensive
remedy than was then provided for by law. It is suggested that the
Act as it is presently interpreted in this respect, is completely con-
trary to the principle established in 1834.52
52 Supra footnote 7.
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